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In this thesis, we investigate the agency problem associated with 
the firms' Corporate Real Estate holdings. Agency theory sug-
gests that firms bearing high agency cost expand their firms be-
yond their optimal sizes. W e study the effect of the firm's free 
cash flow, corporate governance and M & A on its C R E holding. 
W e find supporting results on the claim that firms with higher 
free cash flow and poorer corporate governance tend to hold 
more CRE. Firms which are acquirers in M & A also hold rela-
tively large C R E which leads to poor performance in terms of 
profit making. A further investigation of changes in profitability 
suggests that acquisition is not profit making but hurts firm's 
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Agency problem exists when the interests of managers and share-
holders diverge. Managers undertake investment decisions, ac-
quisitions, and firm expansion in favor of their own interests 
rather than maximizing the firm value. The managerial on-
the-job consumption which leads to large corporate real estate 
holdings and empire building is also a consequence of agency 
cost. Mitigation of the problem often resorts to competitive 
managerial labor market, compensation or contracting schemes 
aligning the interests of both managers and shareholders, effi-
ciency of corporate governance and also the threat of takeover in 
the market of corporate control. Table 1.1 lists several studies 
on the topic focusing on various aspects. 
A large literature of agency problem focuses on the prior and 
post performance (both accounting operation and stock return 
performance) of acquiring firms and target firms. Healy, Palepu 
and Ruback (1992) [12] and Smart & Waldfogel (1994) [27] study 
the post-takeover performance of acquirers, while Mitchell and 
Lehn (1990) [22], and Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) [1] examine the 
ex ante performance of target firms. The mentioned literature 
follows the claim that M & A is a way to redress the agency prob-
lem, i.e. good firms take over bad firms. Gibbs (1993) [10] fo-
cuses on the agency problem and firm restructuring. He mea-
sures the agency cost by variables of corporate governance, free 
1 
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Table 1.1: Brief Summary of Previous Literature 
Aspcct Method Period Sample Size Source 
Mitchell and Whether bad bidder (clainicdEvent Study 1982-1986 115 US 
Lchn (1990) to suffer high agency cost) 
finally become target. 
Healy, Palepu & Whether firm performance Event Study 1979-1983 50 Mergers US 
Ruback (1992) improved after mergers. 
Gibbs (1993) Determinants of corporate OLS 1982-1987 70 Firms US 
restructuring: corporate 
governance, takeover threat 
and free cash flow. 
Scrvaes (1994) Whether targets overinvest Event Study &c 1972-1987 700 Targets US 
before takeover. OLS 
Smart k Impact on firm performance Event Study 1980-1986 48 MBOs US 
Waldfogel (1994) (ration of operating income 
to sales) after management 
buyouts. 
Datta, How executive compensation Event Study & 1993-1998 9G74 Ac- US 
Iskandar-Datta k determines corporate OLS quisitions 
Raman (2001) acquisition decision and stock 
performance after takeover. 
Agrawal & Jaffe Whether targets Event Study 1926-1996 2083 US 
(2003) underpcrform (measured by Targets 
both operating and stock 
returns) before takeover. 
Brailsford & Market response on capital Event Study 1995-1997 170 Australia 
Ycoh (2004) expenditure announcements. 
Du，Leung h Relationship between OLS 1995-1997 549 Firms US 
Chu (2007) corporate governance and 
corporate real estate holding. 
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cash flow and takeover threat and tests their impacts on restruc-
turing activity. His idea follows that lower agency cost firms 
(i.e. with better corporate governance, lower free cash flow, and 
less takeover threat) will have less pressure on restructurings. 
Servaes (1994) [24], and Brailsford and Yeoh (2004) [2] concen-
trate on over-investment rather than firm performance. Servaes 
(1994) [24] investigates whether targets which are considered to 
have high agency cost overinvest prior to being taken over, while 
Brailsford and Yeoh (2004) [2] test if low agency cost firms will 
gain abnormal positive stock return after capital expenditure 
announcements. As one way to mitigate the agency problem, 
equity-linked compensation of executives is also one branch of 
the study. Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2001) [5] investi-
gates the effect of executive compensation on corporate acquisi-
tion decision and stock performance after takeover. This thesis 
follows the aspect of over-investment or over-expending, but 
narrows to a specific component of firm assets—the corporate 
real estate holdings (CRE). 
Many non-real estate companies choose to commit their scarce 
capital to owning real estate rather than re-deploying such cap-
ital to their core business. In the United States, it is estimated 
that corporate users own over $1 trillion worth of various prop-
erty types, amounting to at least five times the value held by 
publicly traded real estate companies^ Using US data, Tuzel 
(2005) [28] found that on average property makes up 30% of 
a firm's physical capital. In the United Kingdom, many of 
the largest non-real estate companies control property portfo-
lios that are comparable in value terms with those owned by 
mainstream property companies^. 
With the large amount of real estate holdings in non-real 
estate firms, do they create wealth for the companies? Most 
iSee Liow and Ooi (2004) [19]. 
2See Debenham Tewson h Chinnock (1992)[8], and Liow (1995)[18]. 
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empirical work shows that real estate holdings do not improve 
and often worsen the stock market performance of those non-real 
estate firms.3 A more recent study of Liow and Ooi (2004) [19 
shows that C R E has impacted negatively on shareholders' vaiue^ 
in those non-real estate firms. Du, Leung and Chu (2007) [9] also 
show that companies with higher C R E holdings tend to have 
lower excess stock returns^ . So corporate real estate decisions 
suggest a link to the overexpansion symptom of agency problem 
that hurts shareholders' profits. All these empirical studies pro-
vide the evidence of the potential C R E agency problem and call 
for a theoretical-based study. 
So under the hypothesis of existence of agency problem, we 
claim that firms with high agency cost will have relatively high 
C R E holdings. Du, Leung and Chu (2007) [9] investigates the 
same C R E agency problem focusing on the effect of corporate 
governance on corporate real estate holdings. Based on U.S. 
corporations, they find that companies with weaker corporate 
governance have high C R E holdings. W e extend their study 
to a boarder view of agency cost which incorporates the M & A 
matter. A rough expression of our study may be represented by 
the following function: 
CRE = f {Agency Cost). (1.1) 
and we claim that C R E will be positively related to agency 
costs across different firms. 
C R E holdings here are mainly measured by the account of 
Property, Plant Sz Equipment (PPE)®. In measuring agency cost, 
we adopt four main categories of variables aligned with the the-
^For instance, see Deng and Gyourko (1999) [6], and Seller, Chatrath and Webb 
(2001) [23]. 
^Shareholders’ value here is measured by two method: economic value added (EVA) 
and market value added (MVA), where EVA equals to operating profit minus cost of 
capital employed and MVA equals to market value of equity minus book value of equity. 
5Excess stock return here is measured by Jensen's alpha. 
®Hereafter we use CRE and PPE interchangeably. 
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ory: free cash flow, corporate governance, and merger and ac-
quisition. W e empirically investigate the effects of our agency 
cost measures on the firm's C R E holdings. And our results are 
highly significant and support our main conjecture that high 
agency cost firms tend to own a high level of CRE. Specifically, 
firms with higher free cash flow and poorer corporate governance 
tend to hold more CRE. M & A decision also implies information 
of agency cost and shows positive effect on C R E level. Acquiring 
firms apparently hold relatively less CRE. But after controlling 
for endogeneity, firms which ever involved in M & A hold more 
C R E than others. The univariate studies on the changes in prof-
itability around acquisition also support the destructive nature 
of the acquisition decision. 
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. 
Chapter 2 presents the research method and variable measures in 
detail. Chapter 3 is the data description and Chapter 4 presents 
our empirical results. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 2 
Research Method 
2.1 Corporate Real Estate Holding Measures 
As shown in Equation 1.1，we intend to reveal the relation be-
tween the C R E holding level and agency cost. In the whole 
paper, C R E will be mainly measured by the account Property, 
Plant and Equipment (PPE) in the balance sheet. Table 2.1 
shows the composition of PPE. 
W e also utilize the sum of the subaccount "Land and Im-
provements" and "Buildings" to try to obtain a better and more 
focused estimate of C R E holdings. So our regression models are 
PPE/TA = f (Agency Cost); (2.1) 
LANDB/TA = f {Agency Cost); (2.2) 
where PPE and LANDB are scaled by Total Asset. 
The following sections discuss various measurements of agency 
cost. 
2.2 Free Cash Flow Measure 
According to Jensen (1986) [14], cash flow in excess of that 
required to fund all projects with positive net present values 
6 
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Table 2.1: Subaccount of Property, Plant and Equipment. 
Compustat 
Da,ta, Code 
Property, Plant, and Equipment (at Cost) 8 
Land and Improvements 260 
Natural Resources 261 
Buildings 263 
Machinery and Equipment 264 
Leases 265 
Construction in Progress 266 
Other 267 
should be returned to shareholders or otherwise harms the value 
of the firm in undertaking nonprofit able investments. When 
managers have in their hands free cash flow, under the assump-
tion of the existence of agency cost, they will undertake over 
diversification strategies, i.e. operating in multiple segments, 
or over expanding through takeovers. Consequently, the prof-
itability of the firm will deteriorate in the forms of low operating 
performance, i.e. R〇A, R O E etc., and low security return eval-
uated by the stock market. So free cash flow can be regarded as 
one of the measures of agency cost. 
Since free cash flow is a hypothetical concept, a high level of 
accounting cash flow alone is not a sufficient condition for free 
cash flow to be present. Following Brailsford and Daniel [2], we 
measure free cash flow from two aspects: the accounting cash 
flow and the growth opportunity. It is claimed that the hypo-
thetical free cash flow will probably exist in the firms which have 
high accounting cash flow but face a low growth opportunity. In 
other words, holding accounting cash flow fixed, the lower the 
growth opportunity, the higher the level of free cash flow, and 
vice versa. In the matrix of growth opportunities and cash flow 
interaction (Table 2.2), the free cash flow problem is likely to be 
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Table 2.2: Interaction between Cash Flow and Growth Opportunities. 
Growth Opportunities 
Cash Flow Low High 
High A B 
Low C D 
higher in panel A. 
In measuring growth opportunities faced by a particular firm, 
Tobin's Q has been widely used as the measurement for various 
related topics. Since Lindenberg and Ross (1981) [17] and Lang 
and Litzenberger (1989) [16], the calculation of Q has been for-
mulated but in a rather complex and cumbersome way. Chung 
and Pruitt (1994) [4] provided an alternative way to calculate Q 
and proved the feasibility. W e adopt their Q formula as follows: 
Approximate^ = {MVE + PS + DEBT)/ TA, (2.3) 
where 
MVE = the firm's share price (Computstat Item 199) x the 
number of common stock shares outstanding (Computstat Item 
25); 
PS = the liquidating value of the firm's outstanding preferred 
stock (Computstat Item 10); 
DEBT = the value of the firm's short-term liabilities (Com-
putstat Item 5) — short-term assets (Computstat Item 4) + the 
book value of the firm's longterm debt (Computstat Item 9); 
TA = the book value of the total assets of the firm (Comput-
stat Item 6). 
Our measurement of Cash_Flow is the accounting cash flow 
divided by total asset. The accounting cash flow is defined as 
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ACF = INC— TAX-INTEXP-PFDDIV- COMDIV, (2.4) 
where 
INC = operating income before depreciation, (Compustat 
Item 13); 
TAX = total income taxes (Compustat Item 16) — change in 
deferred taxes from the previous year to the current year (change 
in Compustat Item 35); 
INTEXP — gross interest expenses on short and long term 
debt (Compustat Item 15); 
PFDDIV = total amount of preferred dividend requirement 
on cumulative preferred stock and dividends paid on noncumu-
lative preferred stock (Compustat Item 19); 
COMDIV = total dollar amount of dividends declared on 
common stock (Compustat Item 21). 
In summary, we adopt the free cash flow as a measure of 
agency cost. Therefore, firms with higher free cash flow will have 
a higher level of CRE. The conceptual free cash flow is proxied by 
growth opportunities and accounting cash flow together, while 
growth opportunities are negatively correlated with free cash 
flow and accounting cash flow will have positive correlation. 
2.3 Corporate Governance Measures 
Agency problem may be also caused by poor corporate gov-
ernance. So our second measure of agency cost is corporate 
governance. W e study corporate governance from two aspects, 
namely the portion of shares held by outside block holders and 
the C E O compensation. W e expect that the higher the two 
measures which indicate better corporate governance and hence 
a lower level of agency cost, the lower the firm's C R E holdings. 
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2.3.1 Outside Blockholder Ownership 
Minority share holdings are subjected to the free rider problem 
as the minority shareholders may not efficiently monitor the 
managers. It is because shareholders bear all the costs of their 
monitoring activities while benefit only in proportion to their 
shareholdings^ On the other hand, block holders, especially 
outside block holders that have claims to a large fraction of the 
firm's earnings may have stronger incentives to monitor man-
agers. Consequently, managerial discretion is restricted to some 
extent and the agency costs of the firm will be reduced^. W e 
collect information on blockholder ownership from the Compu-
stat Blockholder Dataset^ which provides records of percentage 
o'f shares held by all outside blockholders. The actual variable 
Pcent-outblkhld in our study is calculated by a moving aver-
age involving the current year and the lag year. Since block-
holder ownership is rather stable, we do this to minimize missing 
records and the potential endogeneity problem. 
2.3.2 CEO Compensation 
One way to mitigate the agency problem is through equity-based 
compensation scheme. Shleifer and Vishny (1988) [26] conjec-
ture that equity-based executive compensation should have the 
effect of reducing the non-value-maximizing behavior of man-
agers. Jensen and Murphy (1990) [15] also suggested that equity-
based rather than cash compensation gives managers the correct 
incentive to maximize firm value. Datta, Iskandar-Datta and 
Raman (2001) [5], by studying executive compensation and cor-
porate acquisition decisions, found that executive stock option 
grants provide effective and strong motivation for managers to 
iSee Grossman and Hart (1988) [11]. 
2See Shleifer and Vishny (1986) [25]. 
^The data was originally used in the study by Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers and 
Metrick (2006) [7]. 
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make value-maximizing investment decisions. So we expect that 
the more utilization of equity-based compensation, the lower the 
agency cost which leads to a lower level of C R E holdings. Specif-
ically, we measure C E O compensation as the ratio of Total Value 
of Stock Options Granted (using Black-Scholes) to total com-
pensation which comprises the following items: Salary, Bonus, 
Other Annual, Total Value of Restricted Stock Granted, Total 
Value of Stock Options Granted (using Black-Scholes), Long-
Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total. All the data are 
from Compustat Execomp Dataset. 
Based on the discussions from section 2.1 through 2.3, we 
have the following regression models, controlling for Leverage de-
fined as TotalLongTermDebt / Total Assets^ and also Total As sets 
and Total Sales in the Log form: 
PPE/TA =po + piQ + hCash.Flow + P办 ent-outblkhld 
+ PACEO-Comp + Leverage 
+ /3q Log-Sales + P-j Log-Assets. 
(2.5) 
LANDB/TA =/3o + piQ + ^Cash-Flow + j%Pcent_outblkhld 
+ l3iCEO-Comp + jS^Leverage 
+ Pq Log-Sales + jSj Log .Assets. 
(2.6) 
2.4 Merger and Acquisition Effect 
Besides the free cash flow, corporate governance and C E O com-
pensation, we also consider Merger and Acquisition activities 
among those firms since M & A , and so do the literature, has so 
many things to do with agency problem. Tracing back to Marris 
CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH METHOD 12 
(1963) [21] and Manne (1965) [20]，they argue that agency prob-
lem hurts the company and results in a relatively low stock price. 
Consequently this may trigger potential takeovers by low agency 
cost firms and turn into profit-maximizing operation. The ar-
gument may be regarded as the efficiency hypothesis of market 
for corporate control. On the other hand, Jensen (1986) [14] ar-
gues that though takeover is a way to mitigate agency problem, 
high agency cost firms still make value-reducing acquisitions. In 
other words, takeovers may act simultaneously as the solution 
to and the symptom of agency problem. 
In our study, if the argument of Marris and Manne holds, then 
a firm being an acquirer implies a low level of agency cost and 
hence holds a relatively low level of CRE. On the other hand, 
if Jensen's claim holds, then the acquirer is suffering agency 
problem and it will have a higher level of C R E holdings. So 
whether a firm ever involves in M & A implies the information of 
agency cost and hence the C R E level. W e take this into account 
in our regression models 
PPE/TA =如 + 6iACQ + 62X. (2.7) 
LANDB/TA = 5o + 61 ACQ + 52X. (2.8) 
where ACQ is the dummy variable which takes value one if 
the firm is an acquirer, and zero otherwise, and X denotes the 
vector variable containing variables in Equations 2.5 and 2.6. 
According to Marris (1963) [21] and Manne (1965) [20], and 
Jensen (1986) [14], the dual role of takeover raises endogeneity 
in our OLS regression model. W e must resolve the endogeneity 
problem to get an unbiased estimator. The discussion of the 
endogeneity problem of acquisition is left for the next section. 
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2.5 The Endogeneity Problem of Acquisition 
With the agency theory that merger and acquisition is one of 
the forms of improper expansion (Jensen's augument), we may 
not be able to reveal the true relation between acquisition and 
C R E level in the OLS regression since acquisition is also the 
correction of agency problem. Moreover, a high agency cost 
firm, which already has a high level of C R E holdings but still 
has not reached the satisfactory level of management , may self-
select into the M & A transaction which will further increase its 
holdings of CRE. Aggregating all these hypotheses, there is en-
dogeneity problem in the regression models 2.7 and 2.8. In order 
to control for endogeneity, we adopt the Heckman's two-stage 
procedure [13]. A similar method is also employed by Campla 
and Kedia (2002)[3] explaining the diversification discount. Also 
a cross-sectional-time-series dataset is used in their paper. Our 
paper follows their model construction and data structure. W e 
are interested in the estimation of 6i in Equations 2.7 and 2.8 
which are the base equations in the Self-Selection model. 
Our hypothesis is that firms who choose to take over are not 
random within our sample. If a firm's decision to take over other 
firms is correlated with the agency cost of the firm and hence 
the C R E level, ACQ will be correlated with the error term in 
Equations 2.7 and 2.8. The OLS estimate of 5i will be biased. 
Specifically, we assume that a firm's decision to take over is 
determined by 
ACQ； = pZi + iM 
ACQi = 1 if ACQ； > 0 (2.9) 
ACQi = 0 iiACQ； < 0 
where ACQ* is an unobserved latent variable that measures 
the decision on takeover, Zi is the set of variables that contains 
the characteristics of the firm and also exogenous market and in-
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dustry variables affecting the decision of takeovers*. Though, in 
practice, ACQ* is unobservable, it is known whether the latent 
variable has crossed a threshold, i.e. ACQ* > 0 or ACQ* < 0. 
So ACQ I takes one if the firm took over a target {ACQ* > 0), or 
zero if the firm did not involve in M & A transaction {ACQ* < 0). 
Under the above probit model construction, we estimate ex-
pected PPE level under the condition of whether ACQ^ takes 
one or zero. 
E{PPE,lTA,\ACQi = 1) = (5o + + 82X1 + E{ei\ACQi 二 1)， 
(2.10) 
E{PPE^lTA^\ACQi = 0) = 5Q + 62Xi+E{ei\ACQi = 0). (2.11) 
In assuming that the error terms in Equation 2.7 and 2.9, e^  
and fii, have a bivariate normal distribution with means being 
zero, standard deviation cTg being equal to one and with corre-
lation p, we have 
E{ei\ACQ, = l)=pcjMPZi), 
where 
“ 們 解 i ) 
綱=禍, (2 13) 
- 鹏 ） (2.13) 
鹏 ) = i ^ w ^ r 
The difference in the expected PPE level of acquiring firm 
and non-acquiring firm is given by 
4Detail of Zi will be discussed in the empirical result chapter (Chapter 4). 
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E(PPEi/TAi\ACQi = l)-E(PPEi/TA^\ACQ, = 0) 
(2.14) 
where the right-hand side of Equation 2.14 is the coefficient 
of ACQ in Equation 2.7 estimated by OLS regression. 
As shown by Equation 2.14, the estimation under OLS will 
be biased downward if p, the correlation of the error terms, is 
negative, which means the higher the PPE level, the lower the 
probability of takeover. The estimation will be biased upward if 
p is positive, which means P P E level is positively correlated to 
the probability of takeover. 
After we have estimated Equation 2.9 using a probit model 
A 
to get consistent estimates of P denoted by /3, we then use them 
to get estimates of Ai and A2 by formula 2.13 to correct for 
self-selection. In the second step, we estimate (^i by estimating 
PPEi/TAi =5o + 5iACQi + 足 
+ 6x[Xi{pZi) * ACQ, + X20Zi) * (1 - ACQi)] + 77, 
=60 + SiACQi + 52Xi + (^ aA + Tji, 
(2.15) 
where 5\ = pcje. So the sign of 5\ is determined by the sign 
of p, the correlation between the error terms in Equations 2.7 
and 2.9. And the estimation of the coefficient of ACQ^ is 
unbiased and free of endogeneity problem. 
The same treatment is applied to the model of LANDB/ TA. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 3 
The Data 
Our data consist of 1183 firms which are simultaneously avail-
able in the following databases: Compustat Industrial Annual 
which provides accounting data for firms, Blockholder Dataset 
which provides information on blockholders, and Compustat Ex-
ecutive Compensation that provides CEO-compensation records. 
Merger & Acquisition records of these 1183 firms are obtained 
from the Securities Data Company's (SDC) Transactions database. 
Our time span covers the period from 1997 to 2001. During the 
sample period, 527 M & A transactions took place involving 461 
acquisitions and 66 targets. The distribution of total firms and 
acquirers from 1997 to 2001 is reported in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Acquisitions. 
Year Number of Firms Number of Percentage of 
Acquiring Firms Acquirer 
1997 n ^ m 7.40% 
1998 1155 92 7.99% 
1999 1133 112 9.89% 
2000 1068 97 9.08% 
2001 1031 74 7.18% 
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Table 3.2 shows the industry distribution of our sample. Our 
sample covers 10 industries. The firm number in each industry 
is rather stable in the five-year period. Besides a full sample 
study, we also split the data into two sub-samples for a robust 
examination. One sub-sample consists of industry B, C, and D 
which are Mining, Construction and Manufacturing. The other 
sub-sample covers the rest of the data. Firms in the mining, 
construction and manufacturing industry (the M C M industry) 
are considered to have large physical assets in the production 
process. O n the other hand, for firms in other industries (i.e. 
trade and services sectors), their needs for specific physical as-
sets are lower. As shown in Table 3.3, the split is almost half 
divided from the full sample in each year. The sub-sample in-
vestigation will provide us a thorough study of the C R E holding 
behavior in different industries. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 4 
Empirical Results 
4.1 Free Cash Flow and Corporate Gover-
nance 
Following our discussion in Chapter 2，we perform the pooled-
data regressions of equation 2.5 and 2.6. The results are dis-
played in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. W e fix the independent variables 
at the current year (year 0)，and the dependent variables take 
the values from year -1 to year 3. So we perform five regressions 
of P P E and L A N D BUILDING respectively. This enables us to 
investigate the agency cost effect around the current year. 
For the results of P P E in Table 4.1，all the coefficients of in-
dependent variables Q, Cash Flow, Pcent_Outblkhld, and C E O 
Compensation are significant at the 1% confidence level in the 
five regressions. Tobin's Q has an average marginal effect of 
-0.02 on PPE/TA，which reveals that the higher the growth op-
portunity faced by the firm, the less the C R E held. Cash Flow 
is magnificently affecting P P E that the ratio of PPE/TA in-
creases over 0.6 corresponding to every unit increment of cash 
flow. The results provide evidence on the reverse effects of Q 
and Cash Flow. For our corporate governance measure, percent-
age of outside blockholdings and also C E O Compensation show 
negative effects on C R E holdings, a decrease of -0.002 and -0.1 
19 
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respectively by a unit increment of both variables. These are 
consistent with our assertion that better corporate governance 
reduces agency cost and leads to a lower level of C R E holdings. 
(Table 4.1 about here) 
A similar result is shown in Table 4.2 for the L A N D BUILD-
ING case. Though estimations of Q are not so significant com-
pared with the results in PPE, estimations of Cash Flow, Pcent_ 
Outblkhld, and C E O Compensation are still significant at the 
1% confidence level. Cash_Flow still plays a non-negligible role 
in affecting L A N D BUILDING level. A unit increase of cash flow 
leads to a 0.15 increment of L A N D B / T A on average. The effects 
of percentage of outside blockholdings and C E O Compensation 
also decrease in magnitude. 
(Table 4.2 about here) 
In summary, all our measures of free cash flow and corporate 
governance significantly affect firms' C R E holdings. As we have 
discussed in section 2.2, the reverse effects of Q and cash flow 
are confirmed in our empirical results. Moreover, the effect of 
cash flow is larger than that of Q. Firms with higher power 
of C E O incentive compensation tend to hold less CRE. Also a 
larger fraction of outside block holdings shows a better corporate 
governance and therefore lowers the level of C R E holdings. Since 
the L A N D BUILDING measure of C R E is narrower, magnitude 
of effects on L A N D BUILDING are less than that on PPE, but 
signs are still consistent with the agency cost hypothesis. 
4.2 M & A Effect 
In this section, we report the preliminary OLS results of M & A 
effect by estimating equation 2.7 and 2.8. Table 4.3 shows the 
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regression results of PPE. All estimations of the dummy variable 
Acq show significant impacts on PPE. The results indicate that 
if the firm is an acquirer at year 0，then on average its PPE 
level is about 0.075 less than a non-acquirer firm from year -1 
through 3. 
(Table 4.3 about here) 
For the regression on L A N D BUILDING, Acq has significant 
negative effects in the two consecutive years after acquisition at 
the 5% confidence level (year 1 and year 2). The estimations 
are -0.02 and -0.0186 respectively. 
(Table 4.4 about here) 
Following the efficiency hypothesis of market for corporate 
control (i.e. the argument of Marris and Manne), an acquirer 
tends to operate in a low agency cost environment and takes 
over targets bearing high agency cost. Hence, they hold rel-
atively lower C R E compared with other firms. Our result is 
consistent with the exertion and supports their argument. All 
other variables remain significant and have the same signs as in 
the previous section. 
However, the estimation may suffer from possible endogeneity 
problem as discussed in section 2.4. Therefore, we can not have a 
solid conclusion with the results above. So we further investigate 
the M & A effect through the Heckman Self Selection Model in 
the coming section. 
4.3 Self-Selection Correction 
The first part of the section discusses the construction and hence 
reports the estimation of the probit model required in the first 
step of the Heckman Model. The second part comes up with 
the estimation results of the selection model. The procedure is 
based on the model developed in section 2.5. 
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4.3.1 Estimating the Probability of Acquisition——Probit 
Estimation 
The independent variables of the probit model consist of three 
sets of variables which are the firm-specific characteristic vari-
ables that are also included in our OLS model in the previous 
sections, the industry characteristic variables and the economy-
related variables. Firm-specific variables include Q, Cash_Flow, 
Leverage, Log Assets, Log Sales, and CAPX/Sales which denote 
capital expenditures over sales, and also their lag values. Be-
sides, we also include corporate governance measure variables 
Pcent-OutBlkhld and CEO-Comp. For the industry variables, 
we adopt the concentration ratio and the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index of concentration with respect to total assets (measur-
ing industrial resources allocation) and sales (measuring market 
share) defined as 
C7M = f>“ （4.1) 
i=l 
where i = 1,2,3,4 are the four largest firms in terms of total 
asset or sales, and 
H H I = t x l (4.2) 
i=l 
where n is the total number of firms in the industry. W e cap-
ture economic effect by including real G D P growth and S&P500 
Index return. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 4.5. Q in the 
current year shows a significant negative impact on the proba-
bility of acquisition which means high growth opportunity firms 
do not take over much. For the variable Log Assets, the results 
show that larger firms in the recent past year have higher prob-
ability in taking over other firms in the current year. This may 
be due to agency problem of empire building. Also firms with 
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higher sales and higher capital expenditures in recent past year 
are more likely to take over others. 
A striking finding is that CEO_Comp also explains the prob-
ability of takeover. The significant estimation of the negative 
effect of CE〇_Comp says that with good corporate governance, 
which is higher executive compensation aligning management 
and shareholder interests, the firm is less likely to take over 
other firms. 
The findings above reveal the fact that an acquirer may not be 
a firm free of agency problem. This contradicts the results in the 
last section that acquirers have relatively low agency cost and 
hence hold less CRE. The contradiction suggests the potential 
existence of endogeneity problem. 
Industrial characteristics also have significant explanatory 
power of acquisition. A firm which is in the industry with higher 
sales concentration ratio (CR4_sales) and Herfindahl—Hirschman 
Index of total assets (HHLasset) in the current year is more 
likely to be an acquirer as it may have monopoly power in the 
industry. 
(Table 4.5 about here) 
4.3.2 Self-Selection Model 
Based on the results from the previous section, we report the 
second stage of the endogenous self-selection model in Table 4.6 
and 4.7. Compared with the pooled OLS regression of PPE, 
the average estimated coefficient of Acq turns from negative to 
positive on average from -0.075 to 1.68 at the 1% confidence 
level. That means from being an acquirer, the C R E holding 
is 1.68 more than other firms. The coefficient of 入，the self-
selection parameter, is significant and negative which shows the 
prevalence of self-selection and a downward bias under OLS. 
(Table 4.6 about here) 
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For the result of L A N D BUILDING, estimations of Acq all 
become significant and positive at the 1% confidence level. The 
new coefficient of Acq is 0.54 on average. Also the A coefficient 
is negative and significant at the 1% level. 
(Table 4.7 about here) 
In summary, the downward bias of Acq is obvious in the 
comparison between the OLS and Self-Selection estimation. Be-
sides, other variables are still significant (except Q in the L A N D 
BUILDING regressions) and keep their expected signs as the 
results in section 4.1. According to our discussion of M & A ef-
fect in section 2.4 and 2.5，the results reported here reject the 
efficiency hypothesis of corporate control and accept Jensen's 
non-profit-making acquisition due to agency cost. 
In order to have more evidence to support the efficiency-
decreasing nature of acquisition above, we further perform a 
univariate test of profitability from assets around the acquisition 
year in section 4.5. 
4.4 Effects of Target Firms 
The previous section investigates the difference between acquirer 
firms and non-acquiring firms. In this section, we confine the 
study only to the group of acquiring firms. W e incorporate the 
characteristics of the target firms and see if there are any stylized 
patterns of the targets affecting C R E holdings of acquirers. The 
equations are 
PPE/TA =po + Pi TRG-EBITA + 历 TRG_Q 
+ ps TRG.Leverage + p^Size + ‘ 
LANDB/TA + pi TRG-EBITA + p2 TRG.Q 
+ TRG-Leverage + p^Size + P^X] • 
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where TRG.EBITA denotes the ratio of EBIT to the to-
tal assets of the target firms, TRG-Q denotes target firms' Q, 
TRG-Leverage is leverage of targets and Size is defined as the 
logarithm of the ratio of the acquirer's equity to the target's eq-
uity. X is the vector containing variables in our previous models. 
The target variables take the value at the preceding year of the 
takeover. 
The results are reported in Tables 4.8 and 4.9. They all show 
that there are no consistently significant effect of the target char-
acteristics upon acquirers' C R E holdings, no matter in PPE or 
L A N D B A regression. The coming section investigates changes 
in profitability around takeover year among the acquiring firms. 
(Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 about here) 
4.5 Changes in Profitability Around Acquisi-
tion 
Based on the result from section 4.3, we further investigate 
changes in profitability of acquirers around the takeover year. 
W e focus on the profitability from asset, i.e. R O A or specifi-
cally EBIT over Total Assets. 
The first half of Table 4.10 reports the comparison of R O A 
from year to year. The interesting finding is that before the 
year of acquisition, year 0，ROA shows insignificant minor im-
provement from year -3 to year -2 and from year -2 to year -1. 
But starting from year 0, the takeover year, R O A significantly 
decreases from year -1 to year 0，year 0 to year 1 and year 1 
to year 2. Correspondingly, the value changes of EBIT show 
significant increments from year -3 to year -2，year -2 to year -1 
and year -1 to year 0. But after the acquisition year (year 0), 
increases of EBIT are trivial. Also we can see that from year to 
year, the total assets never stopped expanding. 
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(Table 4.10 about here) 
From the second half of Table 4.10, we also make comparisons 
to a base year (year -3 and year 0). The results still reveal a 
deterioration pattern of profitability (ROA) starting from the 
takeover year. Increments of EBIT are insignificant compared 
with year 0. Finally, the percentage changes in total assets are 
always significant. 
In summary, the results suggest that while acquirers always 
expand their asset holdings, they did not retrieve profit from 
their investment on assets and even get worse after taking over 
other firms. This finding is consistent with and supportive of 
the self-selection results that acquirers are actually operating in 
a relatively high agency cost environment and over-expanding 
their C R E holdings. 
Combined with the free cash flow and corporate governance 
measures, the effect of agency cost on firms' C R E holdings is sig-
nificant and positive. Firms with high free cash flow and poor 
corporate governance will have a high level of C R E holdings 
through year -1 to 3. Also, firms which have ever been acquir-
ers are suffering from agency problem and hence hold relatively 
larger amount of CRE. The next section studies the agency prob-
lem of C R E holdings in different industry groups that will pro-
vide a more sufficient investigation on the topic. 
4.6 Sub-samples 
In this section we repeat the above investigations on the two 
groups of industries: the Mining, Construction and Manufac-
turing industries, and the rest of the full sample. Firms in the 
M C M industry are considered to rely on physical asset in opera-
tion more than the firms in other industries. Thus, the splitting 
of the sample may be regarded as a control of industrial effect. 
W e only report the results we are interested in. 
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4.6.1 Free Cash Flow and Corporate Governance 
Table 4.11 shows the two sub-sample results of PPE. For the 
M C M industry, we can see that the variables Q, Cash Flow, and 
CEO-Comp are significant at the 1% level except the outside 
block holdings variable. The signs are all consistent with the 
results of the full sample (Table 4.1). For the estimations of 
other industries, all variables in question are significant. 
Comparing the results of two sub-samples, all the effects in 
other industry are more effective in terms of magnitude than the 
M C M industry. The insignificance of Pcent_Outblkhld indicates 
that outside block holdings are ineffective in reducing agency 
cost in the M C M industry, and therefore have no effect on PPE. 
C E O compensation is significantly effective in reducing agency 
cost in both industries. 
(Table 4.11 about here) 
In Table 4.12 we have the results of the regressions on L A N D 
BUILDING. For the M C M industry, all the variables show in-
significant results except CEO-Comp. For other industries, the 
situation reverses. C E O Compensation is no longer effective in 
reducing L A N D BUILDING level but other variables Q, Cash 
Flow and Percentage of Outside Block Holdings are significant 
at the 1% confidence level. 
So when we narrow down the measure of C R E to L A N D 
BUILDING, only CEO—Comp is significant in the M C M indus-
try, and most variables are still significant in other industries ex-
cept CEO_Comp. These may provide us the fact that managers 
in the non-physical-asset-reliable industry have more intention 
or are easier to take perquisites through L A N D BUILDING. So 
C R E (measured by L A N D BUILDING) is still sensible with our 
measurement of agency cost in other industries. 
(Table 4.12 about here) 
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4.6.2 M&A Effect 
Table 4.13 reports the M & A effects on PPE in different years. 
The estimations of the dummy variable Acq are all significant 
at the 1% confidence level. The coefficients are about -0.046 
on average in M C M industry and -0.096 in other industries. 
This reveals that acquiring firms relatively hold less PPE in 
either sub-sample. W e can see other variables retain the same 
signs and magnitudes compared with the results in the previous 
section (Table 4.11). 
(Table 4.13 about here) 
Table 4.14 shows the M & A effects on L A N D BUILDING. 
While estimations of Acq are significant at the 5% level in other 
industries, it has no effect in M C M industry. This again shows 
the fact that in the M C M industry which primarily relies on 
physical assets in operation, L A N D BUILDING does not have 
much to do with our ordinary measure of agency cost. 
(Table 4.14 about here) 
4.6.3 Self-Selection Correction 
In this section we try to get a better estimation of the acqui-
sition effect in our sub-samples. Table 4.15 and 4.16 show the 
Heckman estimations of Acq. 
Table 4.15 reports the results of PPE. As the same case in 
the full sample, both the M & A effects turn from negative to 
positive. The coefficient of Acq changes from -0.046 to 0.016 in 
the M C M industry and from -0.096 to 0.016 in other industries. 
(Table 4.15 about here) 
For L A N D BUILDING results of the M C M industry in Ta-
ble 4.16, M & A effects in year 0 and year 1 become significant 
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and the coefficients are 0.325 and 0.256 respectively. For other 
industries, M & A effects on L A N D BUILDING all become sig-
nificantly positive in different years. By the significant negative 
estimations of Lambda, the downward biases prevail due to en-
dogeneity problem. Based on the results above, we conclude 
that acquisition is to enlarge the firms' C R E holdings no matter 
which industry is considered. 
(Table 4.16 about here) 
4.6.4 Effects of Target Firms 
Corresponding to section 4.4, effects of target firms in different 
industries are shown in Tables 4.17 and 4.18. The results are 
similar to the full sample case. For the regression on PPE, all 
target characteristics are insignificant. Also none of the target 
variables are significant in L A N D BUILDING. 
(Table 4.17 and Table 4.18 about here) 
4.6.5 Changes in Profitability Around Acquisition 
W e also perform the investigation into the changes in profitabil-
ity around acquisition in the two industry groups. Table 4.19 
is the case of M C M industry. W e can see that the results are 
similar to the full sample case. It is clear that earnings from as-
sets (ROA) significantly decreases after the takeover action, no 
matter in the year-to-year or the base-year comparison. The 
increases of EBIT become insignificant starting from year 0. For 
other industries, Table 4.20 shows the same pattern. The firms 
in the two groups are significantly expanding (increasing assets) 
from year -3 to year 3. The finding again supports the non-profit 
making takeover argument as in the full sample case. 
(Table 4.19 and Table 4.20 about here) 
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Table 4.1: OLS Regression of PPE Level. 
{PPE/TA).i (PPE/TA)o {PPE/TA)^ (PPE/TA)^�PPE/TA)f 
Intercept 0.2424 0.2562 0.2580 0.2460 0 . 2 2 7 5 ^ 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Q -0.0191 a -0.0200 a -0.0206 " -0.0197 a -0.0197 ^  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash_Flow 0.6029 ^ 0.6005 & 0.6194 ^ 0.5783 a 0.5400 a 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Pcent.Outblkhld -0.0016 & -0.0017 a -0.0015 ^ -0.0013 ^ -0.0012 & 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
CEO-Comp -0.1242 “ -0.1140 ^ -0.1063 " -0.1083 & -0.1005 & 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Leverage 0.3456 0.3531 0.3423 0.3288 0.3088 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Log Sales -0.1015 -0.0927 -0.0933 -0.0918 -0.0910 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Log Assets 0.1166 0.1046 0.1038 0.1028 0.1034 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
r98 -0.0157 -0.0108 -0.0189 -0.0215 -0.0141 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Y99 -0.0203 -0.0234 -0.0316 -0.0234 -0.0144 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
yoo -0.0305 -0.0353 -0.0358 -0.0267 -0.0235 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
yo l -0.0474 -0.0397 -0.0385 -0.0372 -0.0385 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
No. of observations 4118 4121 4069 4039 4039 
Adjusted 0.26 0.2459 0.2369 0.2221 0.2109 
F-statistic 132.48 123.11 115.81 105.81 99.13 
t The number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation, 
a The estimator is significant at 1%. 
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Table 4.2: OLS Regression of LAND BUILDING Level. 
iLANDB/TA)_i (LANDB/TA)o [LANDD/TA)^ {LANDB/TAh (LANDB/TAh 
Intercept 0.0460 0.0585 0.0620 0.0609 0.0642 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Q -0.0033 b -0.0036 b -0.0040 " -0.0040 b -0.0025 
(0.001) (0,001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash f l ow 0.1895 " 0.1504 " 0.1739 ‘‘ 0.1920 " 0.1363 ‘‘ 
(0.041) (0.040) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) 
Pcent.Outblkhld -0.0007 " -0.0008 " -0.0007 “ -0.0007 “ -0.0006 “ 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
CEO-Comp -0.0418 “ -0.0389 “ -0.0377 “ -0.0362 “ -0.0381 “ 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Leverage 0.2094 0.2084 0.2122 0.2239 0.2314 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Log Sales 0.0207 0.0225 0.0209 0.0219 0.0242 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log Assets -0.0077 -0.0112 -0.0111 -0.0132 -0.0161 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
V98 -0.0090 -0.0068 -0.0058 -0.0042 -0.0041 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
y99 -0.0135 -0.0124 -0.0088 -0.0068 0.0022 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
VOO -0.0188 -0.0173 -0.0136 -0.0023 -0.0008 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
v o l -0.0219 -0.0165 -0.0045 -0.0010 -0.0046 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
No. of observations 2886 2877 2828 2784 2771 
Adjusted 0.075 0.0707 0.0673 0.0665 0.0645 
F-statistic 2 0 ^ 18.37 
t The number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation. 
"The estimator is significant at 1%. 
' 'The estimator is significant at 5%. 
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Table 4.3: M&A Effect on PPE Level. 
(PPE/TA).^ {PPE/TA)o {PPE/TA)i {PPE/TA)2�PPE/TA)f 
Intercept 0.2247 0.2376 0.2380 0.2270 0 . 2 0 8 9 ^ 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Acq -0.0705 -0.0741 a -0.0795 ® -0.0751 ^ -0.0730 ® 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Q -0,0182 a -0.0191 a -0.0196 a -0.0188 ® -0.0188 & 
(0,002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash_Flow 0.6061 » 0.6039 " 0.6232 » 0.5827 & 0.5439 a 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
Pcent.Outblkhld -0.0016 a -0.0017 “ -0.0015« -0.0013« -0.0012 a 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
CEO.Comp -0.1211 a -0.1107« -0.1030 a -0.1050 " -0.0971 ^  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Leverage 0.3412 0.3485 0.3374 0.3241 0.3043 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Log Sales -0.1022 -0.0934 -0.0940 -0.0926 -0.0918 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Log Assets 0.1202 0.1084 0.1080 0.1069 0.1073 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Y98 -0.0150 -0.0100 -0.0180 -0.0208 -0.0134 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
r99 -0.0183 -0.0214 -0.0292 -0.0213 -0.0123 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
VOO -0.0300 -0.0347 -0.0352 -0.0263 -0.0230 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
r o i -0.0491 -0.0414 -0.0403 -0.0390 -0.0402 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
No. of observations 4118 4121 4069 4039 4039 
Adjusted R2 0.2673 0.2541 0.2466 0.2307 0.2191 
F-statistic 126.18 117.98 111.95 101.93 95.42 
t The number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation, 
a The estimator is significant at 1%. 
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Table 4.4: M&A Effect on LAND BUILDING Level. 
— {LANDD/TA).i {LANDB/TA)o {LANDB/TA)i {LANDB/TA)2 (LANDB/TAh 
Intercept 0.0431 0.0548 0.0566 0.0560 0.0596 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Acq -0.0106 -0.0133 -0.0200 b -0.0186 -0.0169 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Q -0.0032 h -0.0034 '' -0.0038 ® -0.0038 « -0.0023 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash-Flow 0.1900 a 0.1508 " 0.1748 " 0.1926 " 0.1371 ‘‘ 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) 
Pccnt.Outblkhld -0.0007 “ -0.0008 " -0.0007 " -0.0007 " -0.0007 " 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
CEO.Comp -0.0416 -0.0387 » -0.0374 " -0.0359 " -0.0377 ^  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Leverage 0.2089 0.2076 0.2112 0.2225 0.2301 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Log Sales 0.0203 0.0221 0.0201 0.0211 0.0235 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log Assets -0.0068 -0.0100 -0.0093 -0.0115 -0.0144 
(0,006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
KQS -0.0088 -0.0067 -0.0057 -0.0040 -0.0040 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Y99 -0.0132 -0.0121 -0.0083 -0.0063 0.0026 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
r o o -0.0187 -0.0173 -0.0135 -0.0021 -0.0007 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
KOI -0.0223 -0.0169 -0.0051 -0.0016 -0.0051 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
No. of observations 2886 2877 2828 2784 2771 
Adjusted 0.075 0.071 0.0682 0.0672 0.065 
F-statistic 20^ 19^ 17.05 
t The number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation. 
"The estimator is significant at 1%. 
b The estimator is significant at 5%. 
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Table 4.5: Probit Estimates of Acquisition Decision. 
Coefficient Chi-Square Standard Error 
Intercept -1.2814 5.051 
Q -0.0454 b 5.67 0.019 
Cash_Flow 0.1553 0.05 0.719 
Leverage -0.5577 2.48 0.354 
Log Assets -0.9821 ^ 49.65 0.140 
Log Sales -0.2010 1.23 0.181 
CAPX/Sa les -0.3208 0.42 0.496 
Q (1 lag) 0.0121 0.36 0.020 
Cash Flow (1 lag) -0.9367 1.44 0.780 
Leverage (1 lag) 0.7186 2.07 0.500 
Log Assets (1 lag) 0.4792 b 6.06 0.195 
Log Sales (1 lag) 0.4885 ^ 4.06 0.243 
CAPX/Sa les (1 lag) 1.4249 b 4.93 0.642 
Q (2 lag) -0.0216 1.3 0.019 
Cash Flow (2 lag) 0.0929 0.03 0.528 
Leverage (2 lag) -0.0807 0.04 0.411 
Log Assets (2 lag) 0.1707 1.02 0.169 
Log Sales (2 lag) -0.2175 1.47 0.179 
CAPX/Sa les (2 lag) -0.2630 0.43 0.402 
Pcent-OutBlkhld -0.0007 0.07 0.003 
CEO-Comp -0.2025 ^ 3.57 0.107 
CR4_assets -1.3231 1.54 1.066 
CR4_assets (1 lag) 0.3180 0.08 1.141 
CR4_sales 2.4550 ^ 5.31 1.065 
CR4_sales (1 lag) -1.9705 ^ 3.19 1.104 
HHI_assets 1.9682 ^ 3.13 1.113 
HHI_assets (1 lag) 0.1881 0.03 1.132 
HHI-sales -1.2481 1.13 1.173 
HHI-sales (1 lag) -0.5548 0.2 1.238 
GDP_growth 37.8701 0.93 39.187 
GDP_growth (1 lag) 123.3216 1.14 115.615 
SNP_return 1.7398 1.37 1.485 
SNP_return (1 lag) -7.8485 1.28 6.926 
No. of observation 3870 
Log Likelihood -1057 
%Acquirer observation 9.72% 
a The estimator is significant at 1%. 
b The estimator is significant at 5%, 
e The estimator is significant at 10%. 
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Table 4.6: Self-Selection of Acquisition on PPE. 
(PPE/TA)^： (PPE/TA)o (PPE/TA)： {PPE/TA)2 {PPE/TA)3~ 
Intercept -1.4447 -1.6677 -1.4186 -1.3359 -1.3343 
(0.132) (0.132) (0.134) (0.136) (0.136) 
Acq 1.6859 ” 1.9305 “ 1.6627 " 1.5719 & 1.5399 “ 
(0.137) (0.137) (0.138) (0.141) (0.141) 
Q -0.0095 a -0.0085 " -0.0114 a -0.0117 a -0.0126 a 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash_Flow 0.6850 ” 0.6766 ^ 0.7105 a 0.6717 a 0.6584 a 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) 
Pcent.Outblkhld -0.0015 ® -0.0016 ^ -0.0014» -0.0013» -0.0011 a 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
CEO .Comp -0.0920 « -0.0775 a -0.0726 “ -0.0751 ” -0.0699 " 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Leverage 0.3200 0.3257 0.3162 0.3023 0.2805 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Log Sales -0.1102 -0.1027 -0.1034 -0.1030 -0.1027 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log Assets 0.1566 0.1500 0.1456 0.1437 0.1451 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
y98 -0.0078 -0.0028 -0.0126 -0.0177 -0.0078 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Y99 -0.0058 -0.0068 -0.0183 -0.0126 -0.0009 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
yoo -0.0238 -0.0273 -0.0297 -0.0213 -0.0167 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
r O l -0.0686 -0.0640 -0.0610 -0.0592 -0.0592 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Lambda -0.9850 " -1.1248 a -0.9773 ‘‘ -0.9238 ^ -0.9060 & 
(0.077) (0.076) (0.077) (0.079) (0.079) 
No. of observations 3868 3869 3823 3796 3793 
Adjusted R^ 0.3008 0.2963 0.2809 0.2641 0.2566 
F-statistic 128.98 126.31 115.84 105.79 101.7 
t The number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation. 
" T h e estimator is significant at 1%. 
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Table 4.7: Self-Selection of Acquisition on LAND BUILDING. 
— {LANDD/TA)-i {LANDB/TA)o [LANDB/TA)^ {LANDB/TA)^ [LANDB/TAh 
Intercept -0.4225 -0.5312 -0.4878 -0.4619 -0.4707 
(0.139) (0.141) (0.143) (0.145) (0.148) 
Acq 0.4772 » 0.6014" 0.5518 a 0.5286 " 0.5395 “ 
(0.144) (0.147) (0.149) (0.152) (0.154) 
Q -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash-Flow 0.2801 » 0.2460 » 0,2553 " 0.2453 " 0.2141 " 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051) 
Pcent.Outblkhld -0.0006 " -0.0007 " -0.0007 " -0.0006 " -0.0006 " 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
CEO.Comp -0.0354 " -0.0320 " -0.0298 " -0.0298 " -0.0331 " 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Leverage 0.1968 0.1976 0.201 0.216 0.2243 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Log Sales 0.0127 0.0140 0.0129 0.0134 0.0150 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log Assets 0.0082 0.0074 0.0064 0.0042 0.0027 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
V98 -0.0065 -0.0042 -0.0032 -0.0023 -0.0009 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
r 9 9 -0.0085 -0.0058 -0.0026 -0.0013 0.0074 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
VOO -0.0153 -0.0138 -0.0104 0.0003 0.0012 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
KOI -0.0254 -0.0212 -0.0101 -0.0072 -0.0112 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Lambda -0.2740 " -0.3455 " -0.3217" -0.3081 ” -0.3128 a 
(0.081) (0.082) (0.084) (0.085) (0.086) 
No. of observations 2691 2683 2641 2606 2598 
Adjusted 0.0715 0.0696 0.0657 0.0639 0.0646 
F-statistic 1 6 ^ 1 4 ^ 14.8 
t The number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation, 
a The estimator is significant at 1%. 
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Table 4.8: Effect of Target Firms on PPE. 
{PPE/TA).I {PPE/TA)o {PPE/TA) I {PPE/TA)^ [PPE/TA)^ 
Intercept 0.03405 0.04711 0.04972 0.04080 -0.00886~ 
(0.086) (0.084) (0.083) (0.088) (0.087) 
TRG_EBITA 0.05990 0.05706 0.05976 0.06204 0.05763 
(0.04423) (0.043) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) 
TRG.Q -0.00352 -0.00353 -0.00370 -0.00335 -0.00343 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
TRG-Lcverage 0.10584 0.09098 0.09640 0.09948 0.11297 
(0.064) (0.062) (0.061) (0.063) (0.063) 
Size -0.01257 -0.01374 e -0.00950 -0.00732 -0.01017 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.00780) 
Q -0.01062 b -0.0105 ^ -0.01142 ^ -0.01037 b -0.01029 b 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Cash_Flow 0.91432 “ 0.8382 “ 0.75965 ^ 0.74200 « 0.70248 " 
(0.188) (0.040) (0.180) (0.186) (0.1853) 
Pcent.Outblkhld 0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 
(0.001) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.0010) 
CEO.Comp -0.06991 -0.0649 = -0.07586 b -0.07725 = -0.06385 
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) 
Leverage 0.3380 0.3200 0.31322 0.30446 0.27070 
(0.089) (0.087) (0.086) (0.090) (0.088) 
Log Sales -0.0236 -0.0205 -0.03445 -0.03303 -0.02788 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.01953) (0.019) 
Log Assets 0.04463 0.0400 0.05242 0.05074 0.05149 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
No. of observations 264 264 263 263 263 
Adjusted R^ 0.2298 0.2212 0.2218 0.1916 0.1893 
F-statistic 8M 719 ^ 6.56 
t The number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation. 
® The estimator is significant at 1%. 
b The estimator is significant at 5%. 
c The estimator is significant at 10%. 
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Table 4.9: Effect of Target Firms on LAND BUILDING. 
{LANDB/TA)^i {LANDB/TA)o (LANDB/TA)i {LANDB/TA)2 (LANDB/TA)^ 
Intercept -0.09079 -0.02953 -0.04674 -0.03777 -0.04295 
(0.077) (0.077) (0.067) (0.070) (0.075) 
TRG.EBITA 0.03888 0.03984 0.02816 0.02911 0.03462 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.030) (0.031) (0.034) 
TR.G.Q 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.00513 -0.00167 -0.00214 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
TRG 丄 evcragc 0.05288 0.03477 0.04172 0.0273 0.01276 
(0.057) (0.056) (0.049) (0.049) (0.055) 
Size -0.0030 -0.00496 -0.00126 -0.00002 -0.00158 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Q -0.00588 -0.00405 -0.00387 -0.00361 -0.00313 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Cash-Flow 0.40586 0.25312 0.19398 0.15042 0.19543 
(0.180) (0.180) (0.156) (0.158) (0.172) 
Pcent.Outblkhld -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.00005 
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
CEO.Comp 0.04308 0.02838 0.04044 0.04339 0.04781 
(0.036) (0.035) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) 
Leverage 0.41166 0.35258 0.37372 0.35229 0.34898 
(0.076) (0.075) (0.065) (0.067) (0.074) 
Log Sales 0.01793 0.01792 0.01342 0.02293 0.01879 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
Log Asset -0.00331 -0.00667 -0.00219 -0.01302 -0.00865 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) 
No. of observations 201 199 194 197 198 
Adjusted /？^  0.2014 0.1527 0.2098 0.177 0.1445 
F-statistic ^ ^ ^ 4.02 
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Table 4.11: Sub-sample OLS Regression of PPE Level. 
{PPE/TA).i {PPE/TA)o jPPE/TA), [PPE/TA)2 {PPE/TA)^ 
Mining, Construction and Manufacturing 
Q -0.0133 a -0.0152 a -0.0163 ® -0.0152 & -0.0157« 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cashflow 0.5703 “ 0.5622 a 0.5893 a 0.5679 " 0.5398 a 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) 
Pccnt.Outblkhld 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
CEO-Comp -0.1016 a -0.0935 " -0.0949 ® -0.0985 a -0.0923 “ 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
No. of observations 2362 2364 2339 2321 2320 
Adjusted R^ 0.2076 0.2002 0.2101 0.2048 0.2008 
F-statistic 57.24 54.77 57.55 55.32 53.96 
Other industries 
Q ^-0 .0299 a -0.0300 & -0.0300 a -0.0293 a -0.0284 a 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cashflow 0.7285 a 0.7327 " 0.7540 ^ 0.6946 ^ 0.6386 & 
(0.077) (0.077) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) 
Pcent.Outblkhld -0.0043 “ -0.0043 & -0.0040 “ -0.0036 " -0.0033 " 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
CEO.Comp -0.1180 a -0.1096 a -0.0971 " -0.0961 a -0.0847 " 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
No. of observations 1756 1757 1730 1718 1719 
Adjusted B? 0.3388 0.3192 0.2938 0.2721 0.2548 
F-statistic 82.75 75.83 66.39 59.34 54.41 
t The number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation, 
a The estimator is significant at 1%. 
b The estimator is significant at 5%. 
c The estimator is significant at 10%. 
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Table 4.12: Sub-sample OLS Regression of LAND BUILDING Level. 
= {LANDB/TA).I {LANDB/TA)o {LANDB/TA)i {LANDB/TA)^ {LANDB J TA^ 
Mining, Construction and Manufacturing 
Q -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0012 0.0000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash f l ow 0.0233 -0.0430 -0.0221 -0.0065 -0.0551 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) 
Pcent.Outblkhld 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
CEO.Comp -0.0494 " -0.0482 " -0.0446 " -0.0411 -0.0439 ‘‘ 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
No. of observations 1867 1859 1827 1793 1779 
Adjusted P? 0.0511 0.0521 0.0477 0.0442 0.0428 
F-statistic 10.14 10.28 9.31 8.5 8.23 
Other industries 
Q -0.0096 " -0.0102 托 -0.0101 " -0.0096 " -0.0078 b ~ 
(0.003) (0,003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cash f l ow 0.5071 " 0.5099 " 0.5473 " 0.5855 0.5462 " 
(0.093) (0.093) (0.099) (0.103) (0.103) 
Pcent.Outblkhld -0.0022 " -0.0022 " -0.0022 a -0.0022 " -0.0023 " 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
CEO.Comp -0.0387 c -0.0359 = -0.0337 -0.0317 -0.0321 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
No. of observations 1019 1018 1001 991 992 
Adjusted R^ 0.1602 0.1582 0.1493 0.1524 0.1551 
F-statistic 18.66 18.37 16.95 17.18 17.54 
t The number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation. 
"The estimator is significant at 1%. 
' 'The estimator is significant at 5%. 
c The estimator is significant at 10%. 
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Table 4.13: Sub-sample M&A Effect on PPE Level. 
iPPE/TA)_i {PPE/TA)o jPPE/TA), {PPE/TA)2 {PPE/TA)^ 
Mining, Construction and Manufacturing 
Acq ^ - 0 . 0 4 1 3 ” -0.0468 a -0.0497 a -0.0462 “ -0.0437 ® 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Q -0.0129 a -0.0148" -0.0159" -0.0148 ^ -0.0154 a 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash f l ow 0.5743 0.5669 " 0.5945 “ 0.5729 “ 0.5444 a 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Pcent.Outblkhld 0.0004 » 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
CEO .Comp -0.1001 -0.0917 ^ -0.0931 " -0.0966 -0.0905 " 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
No. of observations 2362 2364 2339 2321 2320 
Adjusted 0.2112 0.2049 0.2154 0.2093 0.2048 
F-statistic 53.68 51.74 54.48 52.16 50.78 
Other industries 
Acq -0.0915» -0.0942 “ -0.1041 “ -0.0966 " -0.0937 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Q -0.0283 a -0.0283 -0.0282 a -0.0276 ^ -0.0267 ^  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cash_Flow 0.7136 ^ 0.7174 “ 0.7355 " 0.6795 " 0.6233 “ 
(0.077) (0.077) (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) 
Pcent.Outblkhld -0.0042 « -0.0042 ^ -0.0039 " -0.0036 & -0.0033 “ 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
CEO .Comp -0.1148 a -0.1063 “ -0.0935 -0.0929 -0.0812« 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
No. of observations 1756 1757 1730 1718 1719 
Adjusted R^ 0.3469 0.328 0.3051 0.2818 0.2639 
F-statistic 78.67 72.42 64.25 57.14 52.33 
t The number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation. 
® The estimator is significant at 1%. 
b The estimator is significant at 5%, 
c The estimator is significant at 10%. 
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Table 4.14: Sub-sample M&A Effect on LAND BUILDING Level. 
= {LANDB/TA).i {LANDD/TA)o {LANDB/TA), {LANDB/TAh {LANDD/TA)3 
Mining, Construction and Manufacturing 
Acq 0.0062 0.0050 -0.0040 -0.0025 -0.0024 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Q -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0012 0.0000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash f l ow 0.0225 -0.0435 -0.0216 -0.0062 -0.0548 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) 
Pcent.Outblkhld 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 • 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
CEO.Comp -0.0496 " -0.0484 » -0.0445 " -0.0410" -0,0438 " 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
No. of observations 1867 1859 1827 1793 1779 
Adjusted R】 0.0509 0.0517 0.0473 0.0437 0.0423 
F-statistic 9.34 9.45 8.55 7.83 7.55 
Other industries 
Acq -0.0508 b -0.0567 b -0.0590 >> -0.0523 -0.0476 ~ 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) 
Q -0.0091 " -0.0095 " -0.0094 " -0.0088 " -0.0071 b 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
CashJFlow 0.4991 " 0.5011 0.5391 " 0.5751 " 0.5374 " 
(0.093) (0.092) (0.098) (0.103) (0.103) 
Pccnt-Outblkhld -0.0022 » -0.0023 » -0.0022 » -0.0022 -0.0023 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
CEO .Comp -0.0388 = -0.0360 -0.0339 -0.0319 -0.0314 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
No. of observations 1019 1018 1001 991 992 
Adjusted 0.163 0.1618 0.1531 0.1552 0.1573 
F-statistic 1 7 ^ ^ 16.41 
t The number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation. 
"The estimator is significant at 1%. 
b The estimator is significant at 5%. 
c The estimator is significant at 10%. 
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Table 4.15: Sub-sample Self-Selection of Acquisition on PPE. 
— (PPE/TAU (PPE/TA)o (PPE/TA)i {PPE/TA)2 {PPE/TA)3 
Mining, Construction and Manufacturing 
Acq 1.6130 a 1.8248 & 1.5539 ^ 1.4488 ^ 1.3182" 
(0.169) (0.170) (0.172) (0.175) (0.173) 
Q -0.0048 b -0.0048 b -0.0083 a -0.0084 " -0.0105 ^  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash—Flow 0.6829 ” 0.6676 & 0.7067 « 0.6828 « 0.6791 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) 
Pcent.Outblkhld 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
CEO.Comp -0.0782 " -0.0678 a -0.0717 a -0.0750 » -0.0712 “ 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Lambda -0.9263 a -1.0485 & -0.8981 a -0.8376 ” -0.7628 " 
(0.095) (0.095) (0.096) (0.098) (0.097) 
No. of observations 2237 2237 2215 2198 2197 
Adjusted R^ 0.25 0.2509 0.2533 0.2444 0.2395 
F-statistic 58.33 58.6 58.77 55.65 54.19 
Other industries 
Acq 1.5520 " 1.8277 1.5740 a 1.5087 a 1.5859 a 
(0.216) (0.214) (0.218) (0.221) (0.223) 
Q -0.0202 a -0.0180 & -0.0201 ^ -0.0206 a -0.0194 a 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Cash.Flow 0,7714 ® 0.7710" 0.7997 a 0.7528 ® 0.7160 ^ 
(0.082) (0.082) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) 
Pccnt-Outblkhld -0.0040 a -0.0039 & -0.0036 " -0.0034 ” -0.0030 ” 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
CEO.Comp -0.0749 & -0,0608 ® -0.0500 a -0.0510" -0.0408 a 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Lambda -0.9217 a -1.0790 ^ -0.9419 ^ -0.9006 a -0.9458 & 
(0.121) (0,120) (0.122) (0.124) (0.125) 
No. of observations 1631 1632 1608 1598 1596 
Adjusted R^ 0.3675 0.3567 0.3264 0.3033 0.2948 
F-statistic 73.85 70.57 60.89 54.49 52.29 
t The number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation, 
a The estimator is significant at 1%. 
b The estimator is significant at 5%. 
c The estimator is significant at 10%. 
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Table 4.16: Sub-sample Self-Selection of Acquisition on on LAND BUILD-
ING Level. 
{LANDB/TA).I {LANDB/TA)o {LANDB/TA)i {LANDB/TAh {LANDB/TA)^ 
Mining, Construction and Manufacturing 
Acq 0.1986 0.3250 a 0.2560 0.1771 0.1317 
(0.135) (0.125) (0.123) (0.121) (0.126) 
Q 0.0003 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0007 
(0,002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash-Flow 0.1269 ® 0.0662 0.0599 0.0374 0.0274 
(0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) 
Pcent.Outblkhld 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
CEO.Comp -0.0500 » -0.0495 -0.0446 " -0.0428 " -0.0464 " 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Lambda -0.1085 -0.1801 » -0.1466 ‘‘ -0.1019 -0.0763 
(0.075) (0.070) (0.069) (0.068) (0.071) 
No. of observations 1767 1760 1731 1700 1687 
Adjusted R^ 0.051 0.0515 0.0462 0.042 0.0421 
F-statistic 8.29 8.35 7.44 6.72 6.7 
Other industries 
Acq 0.9586 “ 1.1073 “ 1.0549 “ 1.1054 1.1369 " 
(0.297) (0.328) (0.339) (0.347) (0.342) 
Q -0.0018 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0002 0.0025 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Cash-Flow 0.4980 » 0.4973 “ 0.5325 " 0.5508 " 0.5077 " 
(0.104) (0.103) (0.110) (0.116) (0.115) 
Pccnt.Outblkhld -0.0022 " -0.0022 " -0.0022 " -0.0021 " -0.0022 " 
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
CEO.Comp -0.0194 -0.0144 -0.0108 -0.0108 -0.0144 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
Lambda -0.5688 " -0.6562 " -0.6279 " -0.6516" -0.6666 " 
(0.167) (0.185) (0.190) (0.195) (0.192) 
No. of observations 924 923 910 906 911 
Adjusted R^ 0.1596 0.1594 0.149 0.1516 0.1572 
F-statistic 14.48 14.45 13.24 13.44 14.05 
t The number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation. 
“The estimator is significant at 1%. 
b The estimator is significant at 5%. 
c The estimator is significant at 10%. 
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Table 4.17: Sub-sample: Effect of Target Firms on PPE. 
(PPE/TA)_i (PPE/TA)o (PPE/TA)2 {PPE/TAh 
Mining, Construction and Manufacturing 
T R G . E B I T A 0.0326 0.03357 0.03599 0.03068 0.02692 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.041) (0.044) (0,043) 
T R G . Q -0.0027 -0.00344 -0.00309 -0.00496 -0.00415 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
TRG_Leverage 0.11768 0.11636 0.11798 0.11693 0.13987 
(0.087) (0.085) (0.082) (0.083) (0.082) 
Size -0.00396 -0.00789 -0.00418 -0.00291 -0.00599 
(0 .008) (0 .008) (0 .008) (0 .008) (0 .008) 
Q -0.02076 a -0.02022 a -0.02137 ^ -0.01953 " -0.02069 " 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Cash_Flow 1.31216 a 1.24497 a 1.19899 “ 1.20208 " 1.2291 a 
(0.237) (0.229) (0.217) (0.224) (0.222) 
Pcent .Outb lkh ld 0.00186 = 0.00169 0.0013 0.00138 0.00116 
(0.001) (0.001) (0,001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO-Comp -0.03407 -0.03846 -0.05834 -0.02885 -0.0228 
(0.051) (0.050) (0.047) (0.049) (0.048) 
No. of observations 175 175 174 174 174 
Adjusted R^ 0.1966 0.2084 0.2341 0.2048 0.2159 
F-statistic 4.87 5.16 5.81 5.05 5.33 
Other industries 
T R G . E B I T A 0.04903 0.0506 0.05527 0.08602 0.10488 
(0.115) (0.115) (0.118) (0.121) (0.121) 
T R G . Q -0.00669 -0.00662 -0.0076 -0.00647 -0.00728 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
TRG丄everage 0.05798 0.03159 0.0667 0.089 0.07373 
(0.143) (0.144) (0.148) (0.152) (0.152) 
Size -0.02322 -0.0174 -0.01238 -0.0071 -0.00809 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Q -0.01004 -0.01048 -0.011 -0.01114 -0.00909 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Cash_Flow 0.60068 e 0.48054 0.35454 0.33876 a 0.23458 
(0.357) (0.359) (0.368) (0.378) (0.378) 
Pcent .Outb lkh ld -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0005 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
C E O . C o m p -0.10942 -0.09394 -0.0996 -0.1246 c -0.1045 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.069) (0.071) (0.071) 
No. of observations 89 89 89 89 89 
Adjusted R"^ 0.3826 0.3272 0.2953 0.2812 0.2622 
F-statistic 3.84 
t The number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation. 
The estimator is significant at 1%. 
b The estimator is significant at 5%. 
° The estimator is significant at 10%. 
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Table 4.18: Sub-sample: Effect of Target Firms on LAND BUILDING. 
= {LANDB/TA).i iLANDB/TA)o (LANDD/TA)^ {LANDD/TA)., {LANDB / TA)^'' 
Mining, Construction and Manufacturing 
TRG-EBITA 0.02363 0.02306 0.01106 0.00717 0.01232 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) 
TRG .Q 0.00383 0.00318 0.0003 -0.000005 -0.0008 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
TRG 丄 cvcragc 0.05409 0.04311 0.03897 0.02734 -0.01161 
(0.056) (0.055) (0.037) (0.035) (0.039) 
Size -0.00359 -0.00642 -0.00301 -0.00253 -0.00319 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Q -0.01163 b -0.00831 e -0.0057。 -0.0054 <= -0.00661 c 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
CfushJlow 0.48728'' 0.28067 0.08152 0.02039 0.09936 
(0.233) (0.232) (0.157) (0.152) (0.167) 
Pccnt.Outblkhld 0.0006 0.0007 0.0002 0.00001 0.0010 
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
CEO.Comp 0.05301 0.01946 0.01858 0.03395 0.04445 
(0.040) (0.039) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) 
No. of observations 141 140 136 136 137 
Adjusted 0.0821 0.0391 0.1016 0.0831 0.0692 
F-statistic 2.14 1.51 2.39 2.11 1.92 
Other industries 
TRG-EBITA 0.08758 0.1007 0.08957 0.05977 0.01701 
(0.109) (0.115) (0.114) (0.118) (0.122) 
TRG .Q -0.0035 -0.00576 -0.00308 -0,00219 -0.0009 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
TRG 丄 cvcragc -0.10855 -0.16273 -0.18963 -0.14919 -0.07076 
(0.154) (0.155) (0.163) (0.167) (0.170) 
Size 0.00558 0.01226 0.01416 0.01076 0.00183 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) 
Q -0.00632 -0.00896 -0.0005 -0.00788 -0.00686 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) 
Cash f l ow 0.41285 0.14853 0.26137 0.29382 0.50735 
(0.379) (0.410) (0.375) (0.399) (0.415) 
Pcent.Outblkhld -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.00171 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO.Comp 0.02497 0.03529 0.04711 0.06197 0.05672 
(0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.072) (0.077) 
No. of observations 60 59 58 61 61 
Adjusted li^ 0.4575 0.3789 0.3833 0.3151 0.333 
F-statistic ^ ^ ^ ^ 3.72 
• The number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation. 
"The estimator is significant at 1%. 
' 'The estimator is significant at 5%. 
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• End of chapter. 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, our study finds significant support of the agency 
problem on the C R E holdings of firms. Firms with higher Free 
Cash Flow and poorer corporate governance tend to hold more 
C R E compared with the others. W e also incorporate M & A ef-
fects on C R E holdings. W e initially find evidence on the hy-
pothesis of efficiency of corporate control market, which shows 
that acquiring firms bear low agency cost and therefore hold less 
CRE. But after controlling for the endogeneity problem, the re-
sult tends to reverse against the above finding. The result sug-
gests that acquirers are operating in a relatively high agency cost 
environment and hence, acquisition is actually a way of over-
expanding the firm regardless of profitability. Statistics on the 
profitability changes around acquisition year further supports 
the destructive M & A effect. Finally, we find no evidence of the 
stylized patterns of the target firms affecting C R E holdings of 
acquiring firms. 
For completeness, we split the full sample into the group of 
Mining, Construction and Manufacting industry and the other 
industry. From the sub-samples we are able to take a look at the 
difference in C R E holding between the physical-asset-reliable 
industry and other industries like service and trade which do not 
rely too much on physical asset in operation. The regression re-
sults on PPE are similar to our full sample in both sub-samples. 
51 
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However, the L A N D BUILDING measure of C R E has different 
results between the M C M and other industries. The differences 
suggest that L A N D BUILDING in those M C M firms are not sig-
nificantly affected by the measures of Q, Cash Flow and outside 
block holding, while firms in other industries preserve most of 
the results from the full sample study. That indicates that when 
we narrow down to the less liquid L A N D BUILDING account, 
managers in the M C M industry (the physical-asset-reliable in-
dustry) are relatively harder to shirk or take perquisites than 
in other industries. Nevertheless, our results of M & A effect are 
consistent with the full sample case after controlling for the en-
dogenous problem. Takeover hurts profit, which prevails in both 
sub-samples. 
• End of chapter. 
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